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Abstract
Sentiment is shown to inuence both West Texas Intermediate (WTI) and Brent futures
prices during the period 2002 - 2013. This is demonstrated while controlling for stock indices,
exchange rates, nancial costs, inventory and supply levels as well as OPEC activity. Sentiment
indices are developed for WTI and Brent crude oils using a suite of nancial proxies similar to
those used in equity research where the inuence of sentiment has already been established.
Given the novel nature of this study, multiple hypothesis testing techniques are used to ensure
that these conclusions are statistically robust.
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1 Introduction
This research is motivated by evidence that sentiment inuences the behaviour of the
stock markets. We show that sentiment inuences prices in the professionally-traded oil
markets by measuring sentiment using indices constructed from a suite of appropriate
nancial oil market proxies. These indices for West Texas Intermediate (WTI) and
Brent crude oils signicantly improve a fundamental model of oil prices for each oil
during the period January 2002 - December 2013.
Sentiment is not only a phenomenon observed by professional traders but sentiment
inuences professional traders. O'Connell and Teo [2009] demonstrate trader overcon-
dence; Coates and Herbert [2008] show a link between testosterone levels and trading
outcomes; Froot et al. [2011] show that current trading decisions are subject to sensitiv-
ity to past portfolio losses, while a recent qualitative study by Fenton-O'Creevy et al.
[2011] of 118 UK-based professional traders in equity, bond, and derivatives markets
nds that traders allow emotions to inuence their trading decision-making in a manner
that deviates from purely rational decision-making.
Sentiment is known to exist in the equity markets. Schmeling [2009] reports that
sentiment has a signicant inuence on stock market returns across many industrialised
countries and has a greater eect on countries which have less market integrity and more
herd-like behaviour from investors. The work of [Baker and Wurgler, 2006] shows that
sentiment is most inuential on rms which are dicult to value. This conrmed the
work of [Barberis et al., 1998] which shows that decisions made regarding investment
are at times biased and subject to systematic errors. These eects are not removed by
arbitrage due to the limits to arbitrage encountered in the equity markets as described
by Barberis and Thaler [2003].
[Wang, 2001] shows that sentiment is active in the agricultural commodity markets.
Borovkova [2011] demonstrates the inuence of sentiment in the oil markets by showing
that the shape of the forward curve is inuenced by very strong or very weak sentiment
as measured by the Thomson Reuters NewsScope product. 1 Dowling et al. [2014]
show evidence for the existence of psychological price barriers in the crude oil markets.
Borovkova [2011] and Dowling et al. [2014] show that sentiment is inuential in the
oil market. However, these papers do not consider the whole range of sentiment. We
show that sentiment can be quantied and used to explain price movements. In this
investigation we use sentiment in oil price models for WTI and Brent and treat it as
an additional variable to the chosen fundamental variables. In doing so we add to
the literature showing that sentiment does not just have an inuence in extreme or in
specic circumstances but has a widespread measurable eect.
We propose that there is sentiment in the oil markets because of the need for spec-
ulation and because of information asymmetry between oil producers and the other
market participants. Long and short hedging activity in the oil markets is not balanced
1 Thomson Reuters Newscope measures the sentiment of the text in news reports using a proprietary
sentiment engine, the details of which are not publicly available.
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[Hirshleifer, 1990]. Oil producers are vulnerable to unexpected changes in the price of
oil and need short hedging positions. However, oil consumers are less vulnerable as they
have many other cost pools in addition to oil prices and so have a lesser need for long
hedging positions. This is in keeping with hedging pressure theory from Keynes [1930]
and Hicks [1939]. Thus we have a situation where speculators provide insurance to pro-
ducers by taking the excess long positions not taken by consumers, but only producers
have access to all the information regarding oil reserves and supply issues.
[Kaufmann, 2011], [Coleman, 2012], [Fan and Xu, 2011] and [Cifarelli and Paladino,
2010] all show that speculation is an important driver of oil prices. As with the equity
markets there are limits to arbitrage, namely the size of the positions traders are per-
mitted to take and the size of the margin calls which traders will incur while they wait
for their prots to materialize. Acharya et al. [2013] make it clear that the limits im-
posed by margin calls make arbitrage partially ineective in the oil markets. Therefore
arbitrage is limited in its ability to remove the eect of sentiment.
Following the methods applied by Baker and Wurgler [2006], Lemmon and Portni-
aguina [2006] and Baker et al. [2012] in their analysis of the equity markets, we build a
similar oil sentiment index and compare the performance of a fundamental model before
and after this sentiment index has been included. Prompt month futures of WTI and
Brent crude oils are used from January 2002 to December 2013 at monthly frequency.
Baker and Wurgler [2006] used the following sentiment proxies in an equity context:
volume of trades, market volatility, closed end fund discount, IPO number and opening
returns, and the put call ratio. None of these was, on their own, a simple measure of
sentiment; each had an idiosyncratic component but a principal component analysis
(PCA) was applied to extract the common signal. In this investigation we use: the
volume of the oil futures traded, the historic volatility of the oil price, the put-call ratio
of oil options, the ratio of speculative trades to oil demand and the implied volatility
of a local stock market index, namely the S&P 500 for WTI and the Euro Stoxx 50
for Brent. None of these is a pure measure of sentiment but, we use a PCA process to
extract the common signal similar to Baker and Wurgler [2006].
The selected proxies for WTI or Brent crude oil are entered into a principal compo-
nent analysis, the rst principal component of which is dened as the sentiment index
for each oil. It is established that low correlations exist between changes in the senti-
ment indices and changes in a range of key fundamental economic variables, showing
that the eectiveness of these indices is not a consequence of fundamental information.
As these sentiment indices are extracted from proxies for sentiment similar to proxies
used in equities research, it is reasonably argued that these indices are measuring oil
market sentiment.
To test the inuence of the sentiment indices for WTI and Brent crude oil, each index
is added to a benchmark oil price model consisting of non sentiment variables. The eect
of sentiment on oil prices is then evaluated statistically while explicitly controlling for
key fundamental variables that are known to drive oil prices. These key fundamental
drivers are:
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broad economic performance as measured by stock index movements, we use the
S&P 500, Euro Stoxx 50, Hang Seng and Nikkei which represent the US, the Eurozone,
China and Japan the world's four largest consumers of oil, following Li and Lin [2011];
1. the US dollar exchange rates for the stock indices used in (i), namely the Euro,
Japanese Yen and Hong Kong dollar following Reboredo [2012], Beckmann and
Czudaj [2013] and Brahmasrene et al. [2014] who indicate a direct connection
between foreign exchange rates and oil prices;
2. the Baltic Dry Index (BDI), following Kilian [2009] and Coleman [2012];
3. the cost of corporate debt, where we use Moody's Aaa as a benchmark corporate
bond rate, following Coleman [2012];
4. the US oil inventory and the World oil supply, and
5. OPEC's spare capacity and proportion of world production following Kaufmann
[2004], Lin and Tamvakis [2010] and Coleman [2012].
To informally measure the improvement to the fundamental model we calculate the
adjusted R2 and F-test results; the likelihood ratio test is used to formally test whether
the improvement to the models after the inclusion of the sentiment indices is signicant
or not. As we perform 92 simultaneous hypothesis tests, it is necessary to address the
multiple comparison problem. That is, when many hypothesis tests are being carried
out simultaneously there is a probability that some null hypotheses may be rejected
falsely. This is addressed with a generalised version of the multiple hypothesis testing
procedure of Holm [1979].
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 explains the selection
of the proxies and the method by which principal component analyses were used to
form the oil sentiment indices for WTI and Brent. Section 3 shows the methods used
for building the fuel price benchmark models against which the two indices will be
tested. Section 4 presents the empirical results for WTI and Brent crude oils and
demonstrates the robustness of our nding that sentiment inuences oil prices using a
multiple hypothesis testing (MHT) framework. Section 5 concludes.
2 Creating an oil sentiment index
In this section the method of constructing an oil sentiment index is described. The
construction involves combining proxies for sentiment using PCA, as used by [Baker
and Stein, 2004], [Baker and Wurgler, 2006], Lemmon and Portniaguina [2006], and
Mian and Sankaraguruswamy [2012] who examine sentiment in the equities market.
The proxies used for the oil markets are selected so as to be similar to those which have
been used building sentiment indices in equity research.
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2.1 Selecting the oil sentiment proxies
Equities research uses a wide variety of proxies for sentiment. None of these proxies are a
perfect measure of sentiment but they are combined using principal component analysis
(PCA) to produce useful sentiment indices. In the same way proxies for sentiment are
chosen from the oil market data and are combined using PCA to form a sentiment index
for each of WTI and for Brent crude oils.
Baker and Wurgler [2006] use the following proxies NYSE turnover, closed end fund
discount, number of and average rst day return of IPOs, share of equity issues in
total equity and debt issues and dividend premium. These are combined in the PCA
process to produce a sentiment index. Baker and Wurgler [2006] explain that while each
proxy will contain an idiosyncratic as well as sentiment component, the PCA isolates
the common sentiment component. We chose appropriate oil market proxies based on
sentiment research in equities which measure market activity, oil price volatility, market
fear, speculation and general stock market volatility. These choices are supported from
within the literature as set out below and in Table 1. The proxies selected to build the
oil sentiment indices are specic to each crude oil as follows:
1. the trading volume of the prompt-month futures contract
2. the 30-day historical volatility of the prompt-month futures price
3. the put call ratio for options on oil futures
4. an oil speculation indicator, namely the ratio of non-commercial futures and op-
tions positions to oil demand, and
5. a geographically appropriate implied volatility index (VIX for WTI and the
volatility of the Euro Stoxx 50 for Brent).
Volume of trades are used as a proxy for investor sentiment by [Scheinkman and
Xiong, 2003], [Baker and Stein, 2004], [Baker and Wurgler, 2007] and [Canba³ and
Kandr, 2009]. While it is clear that the volume of trades is a direct measure of market
activity, the literature shows that it is also an indicator of market sentiment.
Volatility is considered to be a measure of market fear by Whaley [2000], hence
the choice of a volatility measure as a sentiment proxy for each oil. The oil-based
implied volatility measure (OVX) was not available for the 12 years required. Hence
the 30-day historical volatility of the oil futures price is used. This is calculated as the
standard deviation of the log price returns for the previous 30 trading days for prompt
month futures contracts. Thirty-day volatility, which uses approximately the previous
month-and-a-half of price data, was chosen as it is a reasonable compromise between the
measurement of the volatility being accurate and being current. The volatility gures
are obtained from Bloomberg LP and are the second proxy.
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Measure Equity Proxy Oil Proxy References
Market
Activity
Volume of
trades in the
stock market
Volume of
trades of oil
futures
Scheinkman and Xiong
[2003]
Baker and Stein [2004]
Baker and Wurgler [2006]
Canba³ and Kandr [2009]
Asset
Volatility
Volatility of
historic market
return
Volatility of
historic futures
returns
Whaley [2000]
Market
Fear
Put call ratio for
equity options
Put call ratio
for oil options
Bathia and Bredin [2013]
Speculation IPO volume and
initial returns
Ratio of non
commercial
trading volume
to oil demand
Coleman [2012]
Bunn and Chen [2013]
Kolodziej and Kaufmann
[2013]
Market
Volatility
An implied
volatility index
An implied
volatility index
Simon and Wiggins III
[2001]
Whaley [2000, 2009]
Tab. 1: Comparison of Proxies for Sentiment in the Equity Markets and the Oil Markets
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The put-call ratio has been used as a measure of market fear in equity research, for
example by Bathia and Bredin [2013]. The put-call ratio for oil futures options is the
third proxy. The data used is the aggregated open interest futures from Bloomberg LP.
Speculation was measured by Coleman [2012] and Bunn and Chen [2013] using
the churn ratio, which was the ratio of the number of forwards or futures contracts
to physical delivery, this indicated the level of speculation in the oil and electricity
markets respectively. A more specic measure was also used, namely the number of
non-commercial futures positions from the CFTC. This measure was used by Kolodziej
and Kaufmann [2013]. (The US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
denes a commercial position as one held by someone who produces, processes or sells
the commodity, this includes using futures to hedge actual exposure to commodity
prices.) In this investigation, we combine these two methods and use the ratio of non-
commercial WTI futures to world oil supply from the US Dept of Energy as a speculation
indicator for WTI. A similar indicator for Brent is constructed from the corresponding
data from the CFTC for Brent non-commercial futures positions where available and
is the fourth proxy. A diculty with the data is that Brent non-commercial data is
unavailable before April 2008; to overcome this the WTI data is used in its place from
January 2002 to March 2008, this is a reasonable approximation as the price of Brent
and WTI were very closely aligned before 2011.
The VIX was used as a proxy of sentiment by [Simon and Wiggins III, 2001]. Volatil-
ity indices are considered to be measures of investor fear or anxiety [Whaley, 2000, 2009].
The VIX is the weighted average of implied volatilities of rst and second month op-
tions on the Chicago Board of Trade. We use this measure as a proxy when analysing
WTI. The volatility of the Euro Stoxx 50 index (V2X) is used for Brent. The Euro
Stoxx 50 index is comprised of 50 of the largest stocks in the Eurozone and represents
more than 50% of all the Eurozone equities by capitalisation. Equity index volatility is
the fth and nal proxy and is chosen as a proxy for overall sentiment in the economy.
2.2 Building a sentiment index by principal component analysis
This investigation uses PCA to produce a linear combination of the proxies. The
rst principal component is the linear combination of the proxies which captures the
maximum variance compared with other linear combinations subject to normalisation.
[Baker and Wurgler, 2007] oer two comments regarding the robustness of this method:
rst that it reduces reliance on individual proxies (even though measured individually
some are very signicant); and second, that an index constructed from individual proxies
would behave almost identically to that formed by PCA.
A rst stage index is constructed (following Baker and Wurgler, 2006) to decide
whether to use each proxy's current value or its rst time-lagged value. This is to
take into consideration the possibility that some of the proxies may be stronger leading
indicators than others. The rst stage index is the rst principal component of all the
current and rst lags of the proxies. For each proxy the correlation of the current value
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with the rst stage index and the correlation of the proxy's rst lag with the rst stage
index are calculated. The larger value decides whether the current or rst lag is chosen
to build the sentiment indices. The selected proxies are then used in a second PCA
stage, the rst principal component of which is dened to be the sentiment index for
the crude oil in question.
The results of the PCA based oil sentiment construction processes are summarised
in Table 2. Thus for WTI and Brent the sentiment indices are calculated as follows,
WTI Sentimentt = 0:36Trading V olumet 1  0:44WTI V olatilityt  0:53PutCall Ratiot 1
+0:59Spec WTIt   0:22V IXt 1 (2.1)
BrentSentimentt = 0:19TradingV olumet 1 0:63BrentV olatilityt+0:06PutCallRatiot 1
0:46Spec Brentt   0:60V olatility of Stoxxt 1 (2.2)
where WTI or Brent V olatility is the 30-day historical volatility of WTI or Brent and
Spec WTI or Spec Brent is the speculation indicator for each oil. The PCA process
calculates the ratio of the components which maximises variance subject to the sum of
the squared loadings being one.
Wang [2001] showed that sentiment from speculators and hedgers did contain useful
information regarding the movements of agricultural commodity prices but that senti-
ment from small traders was not useful. It is conjectured here that sentiment in the
professionally-traded oil markets is useful as the vast majority of the traders in the
energy markets are highly informed professionals. When Baker and Wurgler [2006],
Lemmon and Portniaguina [2006] and Chung et al. [2012] examined the stock markets
they used an orthogonalisation procedure to remove from the equity sentiment proxies
anything which could be attributed to the economic cycle. This procedure eectively
produced an index which depended heavily on the choice of economic cycle variables.
In order to capture the sentiment in the oil markets, this orthogonalisation step is not
carried out. This choice keeps the sentiment indices and the fundamental variables
independent of each other. This approach is argued to be reasonable due to there being
insignicant or low correlation between the oil sentiment indices and the fundamental
variables (Table 3). This nding also refutes a criticism that the sentiment indices are
eective because they capture fundamental information.
2.3 The sentiment indices for WTI and Brent
Figure 2.1 plots the WTI and Brent sentiment indices as well as the log of the WTI
and Brent price series. It is seen that the Brent sentiment index is quite similar to that
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of WTI with both showing a general upward trend over the period. In addition both
have a severe dip during the period of rapid oil price change in 2008.
Table 3 shows that there is low or insignicant correlation between the rst dif-
ferences of the two sentiment indices and the rst dierences of the key fundamental
variables that we will consider in the fundamental oil price models, which will be dened
later in Eq.3.1 and Eq.3.2. This demonstrates that the indices are not simply capturing
information from these fundamental variables but are also bringing new information
to the model. As this information is extracted from proxies modelled on channels of
sentiment in equity markets, it is reasonably argued that the oil sentiment indices are
measuring oil market sentiment.
WTI Brent
Current (t)
or Lag (t-1)
Loading
Current (t)
or Lag (t-1)
Loading
Trading Volume t - 1 0.36 t - 1 0.19
30-Day Volatility t -0.44 t -0.63
Put Call Ratio t - 1 -0.53 t - 1 0.06
Speculation
Indicator
t 0.59 t 0.46
VIX / V2X t - 1 -0.22 t - 1 -0.60
Variance
Explained
33% 27%
The table shows the loadings from the principal component analysis of the WTI and Brent sentiment
proxies. The choice of current (t) or rst lag (t-1) is made using the method of Baker and Wurgler
(2006). The linear combination of these proxies with their loadings is the rst principal component
for each set of sentiment proxies. This rst principal component is the sentiment index for each crude
oil. The percentage of variance explained by this rst component is listed. V2X is the volatility index
based on the Euro Stoxx 50.
Tab. 2: PCA loadings for WTI and Brent Oil Sentiment indices.
3 Testing framework
To test whether changes in the oil sentiment indices explain price movements in prompt-
month futures contracts for WTI and Brent, a benchmark model for these crude oils is
proposed and tested using a multivariate regression. The benchmark model is specif-
ically chosen to capture fundamental rather than sentiment inuences on oil prices.
The oil sentiment indices are added to the benchmark model for each crude oil and the
extended models are tested again. Changes in model performance are measured using
the informal adjusted R2 measure and variance ratio tests, along with formal likelihood
ratio tests. A common model for both oils is used so that a fair comparison may be
made of the eect of the sentiment index on WTI and Brent crude oils.
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WTI Sentiment Index Brent Sentiment Index
4SP500 0.37 0.10
Euro Stoxx 0.36 -0.05
Nikkei 0.31 0.10
Hang Seng 0.27 0.21
USDEUR -0.20 -0.24
USDJPY 0.14 0.01
USDHKD -0.05 0.03
BDI -0.01 0.14
Moody -0.10 -0.03
US Oil Inventory 0.05 0.00
World Oil Supply -0.06 -0.09
OPEC Surplus 0.14 0.13
OPEC Proportion -0.18 0.09
The table shows the correlations between the rst dierences of the fundamental variables, and the
rst dierences of the sentiment indices for WTI and Brent crude oils. These fundamental variables
are used in the benchmark models of oil price. The results are generally very low correlation with 18 of
the 26 correlations below the 5% signicance level of 0.1642. The sentiment index for WTI is weakly
correlated with the stock indices which is expected as the US is a larger oil producer than Europe.
Tab. 3: Correlation Table: Sentiment Indices and Fundamental Benchmark Variables
3.1 Benchmark model specication
Benchmark models for WTI and Brent are proposed at monthly frequency using the
following fundamental variables:
1. Equity indices: S&P 500, Euro Stoxx, Nikkei and Hang Seng
2. The US$ exchange rate for the Euro, the Japanese Yen and the Hong Kong dollar
3. Baltic Dry Index
4. Corporate bond rates, where we specically consider Moody's Aaa corporate bond
rate
5. US oil inventory and World oil supply
6. OPEC's proportion of world production and OPEC's spare capacity.
We choose a selection of equity indices, from the US (world's largest oil consumer),
the Eurozone (2nd), China (3rd) and Japan (4th) which together accounted for 50% of
world oil consumption in 2012 (US Energy Information Administration). These regions
are represented in our testing by S&P 500, EuroStoxx 50, Hang Seng and the Nikkei
stock indices. There is abundant literature addressing the interactions of oil prices and
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Fig. 2.1: Log of WTI and Brent prices and their Sentiment Indices
stock prices. Jones and Kaul [1996] have reported negative co-movements of stock prices
in response to oil price shocks between 1947 and 1991, although Fan and Xu [2011] nd
that from 2004 to 2009 the S&P 500 did not provide a signicant explanation of oil
prices. Zhang and Li [2014] have found close correlations between oil prices and equity
indices, with the signs of the correlation always positive, which is also the case here.
There has been some debate concerning the inuence of Asian demand on oil prices (see
Li and Lin 2011, Beirne et al. 2013 and Alquist and Gervais 2013) which supports the
inclusion of Hong Kong and Japanese stock indices. It is clear that there is a complex
relationship between oil price and equity prices and hence stock markets must be part
of the fundamental model. The variables S&P 500t; Stoxx 50t; NKYt; Hang Sengt
are the S&P 500, Euro Stoxx 50, Nikkei and Hang Seng stock indices.
Beckmann and Czudaj [2013] have found that nominal dollar depreciation causes
nominal oil price increase. Brahmasrene et al. [2014] nd that US exchange rates
Granger cause oil prices in the short run, although Reboredo [2012] nds that oil price
and exchange rate interaction is weak. These ndings and the selection of stock indices
lead to the choice of the US Dollar against the Euro, Yen and Hong Kong dollar as the
exchange rates for the benchmark model. The variables USDEURt; USDJPYt and
USDHKDt are the values of $1US expressed in Euro, Yen or Hong Kong Dollars.
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The Baltic Dry Index which tracks the cost of shipping goods across the oceans is
used as an indicator of global industrial production following [Mitchell et al., 2005],
[Frale et al., 2008], [Kilian, 2009], Fan and Xu [2011] and [Coleman, 2012] . A criticism
of using the BDI is that it is inuenced by fuel costs, and so is an endogenous variable.
This problem is addressed by [Kilian, 2009] who states that the variation in BDI rates
is much larger than the variation in bunker fuel costs, and so the inuence of the
endogeneity is not important. BDIt is the Baltic Dry index of shipping costs.
Moody's Aaa corporate bond rate is used because Coleman [2012] suggests that since
extraction of oil is a capital-intensive business, the cost of capital should be reected
in the price of oil, and that since oil companies are highly rated Coleman [2012] uses
the Aaa rate. Corp Bondt is Moody's Aaa corporate bond rate.
Following the basic law of supply and demand, the US oil inventory and world oil
supply from the US Dept of Energy (DOE) are also included. US Oil Inventoryt is the
US oil inventory, World Oil Supplyt is the world oil supply.
The proportion of world oil that is produced by OPEC has been found to inuence oil
prices by Kaufmann [2004], Lin and Tamvakis [2010] and Coleman [2012]. This would
occur due to market power. Also included is the dierence between OPEC's estimated
capacity and the production as this represents the decision of OPEC producers to
restrict supply. OPECSpareCapacityt and OPECPropt are the OPEC spare capacity
and OPEC proportion of world production.
Based on the above arguments, the benchmark model for WTI and Brent crude
oil are set out in Eq. 3.1. Before running the regressions, all the data are log trans-
formed, rst-dierenced, standardised and checked for stationarity using Augmented
Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests which show the log returns of the fundamental variables and
sentiment indices to be stationary. Descriptive statistics are given in Table 4. The
benchmark model is given in Eq. 3.1:
Oilt =  + 1S&P 500t + 2Stoxx 50t + 3NKYt + 4Hang Sengt;
+5USDEURt + 6USDJPYt + 7USDHKDt ++8BDIt
+9Corp Bondt + 10US Oil Inventoryt + 11World Oil Supplyt
+12OPEC Spare Capacityt + 13OPEC Propt + "t (3.1)
where all variables are expressed in log returns and Oilt is the WTI or Brent prompt
month crude oil price.
With the addition of the sentiment index this model becomes:
Oilt =  + 1S&P 500t + 2Stoxx 50t + 3NKYt + 4Hang Sengt;
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Mean Std Dev Skew Ex Kurt
WTI 0.011 0.091 -0.797 2.030
Brent 0.012 0.086 -0.939 3.148
S&P 500 0.003 0.045 -0.941 1.947
Stoxx 50 -0.001 0.057 -0.764 1.301
Nikkei 0.003 0.058 -0.910 2.514
Hang Seng 0.005 0.062 -0.781 2.066
USD Euro -0.003 0.031 0.437 1.308
USD Yen -0.002 0.027 0.338 0.369
USD Hong Kong Dollar 0.000 0.001 -0.904 5.614
BDI 0.006 0.249 -1.453 6.624
Bond Rate -0.002 0.037 -0.726 4.909
US Oil Inventory 0.001 0.030 -0.220 -0.122
World Oil Supply 0.001 0.007 -0.084 1.258
OPEC Spare Capacity -0.008 0.170 -1.668 12.383
OPEC Proportion 0.000 0.013 -0.337 2.640
The table shows descriptive statistics for log returns data used in the benchmark models. The data is
from January 2002 to December 2013 (N = 144 months). The price of the prompt month WTI and
Brent crude oil futures contracts are in US$ per barrel. Corporate Bond rate is Moody's Aaa rate.
'Std Dev' is standard deviation, 'Skew' is skewness and 'Ex Kurt' is excess kurtosis.
Tab. 4: Descriptive Statistics
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+5USDEURt + 6USDJPYt + 7USDHKDt ++8BDIt
+9Corp Bondt + 10US Oil Inventoryt + 11World Oil Supplyt
+12OPEC SpareCapacityt + 13OPEC Propt + 14Oil Sentimentt + "t (3.2)
where Oil Sentimentt is the value of the oil sentiment index for WTI or Brent at
time t measured in months. As is usual practice, standardised variables are used so
that comparisons between the variables may be made and so that calculations may not
be liable to oating point errors [Aboura and Chevallier, 2013], thus the  terms are
zero.
4 Results
There is a clear improvement to the benchmark models for WTI and Brent on the
inclusion of the oil sentiment indices as is seen in Table 5. This indicates that these
indices, and hence oil market sentiment, has a signicant inuence on WTI and Brent
oil prices.
4.1 Performance of oil sentiment index
The sentiment indices for WTI and Brent make a statistically signicant and econom-
ically important improvement to the fundamental models for oil price changes during
the 12 years from January 2002 to December 2013. The results are presented in Table
5 and show that the adjusted R2 increases in the WTI and Brent benchmark models
from 35% and 30% to 52% and 49% respectively; in addition the variance ratio test
is much more signicant. More formally, there is a strongly signicant result from the
likelihood ratio test of the improvement to the fundamental model, after the inclusion
of the sentiment indices for WTI and Brent.
Looking at the results in Table 5 it is notable that the coecients of the S&P
500, Euro Stoxx 50 and the Nikkei are all insignicant except for Stoxx for WTI when
sentiment is included; this anomaly will be revisited below in section 4.2. This is
unconvincing evidence that these stock markets have an inuence on oil prices. This
result is in line with the nding of Fan and Xu [2011] that the S&P500 was not signicant
for roughly the same period of time. Following the results of Alquist and Gervais [2013]
and Beirne et al. [2013], we nd that there is evidence at conventional levels that the
Hang Seng signicantly explains WTI and Brent prices, but this will be revisited in
section 4.2.
The exchange rates used are expressed as the price of US$1 in various local curren-
cies, namely the Euro, Yen and Hong Kong dollar. Only the Euro and the Japanese
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Yen are found to be signicant, though the Yen is much less signicant than the Euro.
The cost of one US dollar in Japanese Yen has a positive coecient meaning that a
weakening Yen is on average accompanied by higher oil prices measured in US dollars.
The links between exchange rates and oil prices are not entirely straightforward, (see
Beckmann and Czudaj 2013, and Reboredo 2012), but it is clear that an appreciation
in oil price is accompanied by appreciation of the currency of the exporter, and since
Japan produces a much smaller amount of oil than the US (140,000 barrels per day
from Japan in contrast to 11,110,000 from the US)2, the positive coecient is in line
with expectations. The coecient of the cost of US$1 in Euro is negative, indicating
that a weakening Euro against the US dollar is, on average, accompanied by negative
oil price returns and so a fall in the price of oil measured in US dollars. This indicates
that as the Euro weakens Europeans will actually have to buy fewer of the more ex-
pensive dollars to pay for oil. This may be because a depreciation of the local currency
causes lower demand for oil, as explained in the 'denomination channel' by Beckmann
and Czudaj [2013]. The greater size of Eurozone relative to Japan and the fact that
the Eurozone (which does not include UK or Norway) produces 500,000 barrels of oil
per day, may explain why the Euro exchange rate coecient is negative while the Yen's
coecient is positive.
It is interesting that there is very weak evidence that the Baltic Dry Index (BDI)
is associated with oil price changes; it is only just signicant at the 10% level. This
is unexpected as the BDI has been used as a proxy for worldwide industrial activity
by [Mitchell et al., 2005], [Frale et al., 2008], [Kilian, 2009], Fan and Xu [2011], and
[Coleman, 2012]. The cost of borrowing as measured by Moody's Aaa corporate bond
rate has the expected positive coecient as found by Coleman [2012] indicating that
as borrowing becomes more expensive so does oil. As would be expected by the law of
supply and demand, the US oil inventory has a highly signicant negative coecient
for WTI prices and a less signicant negative coecient for Brent prices. There is no
evidence that world oil supply is signicant; which is unexpected. OPEC spare capacity
is a measure of the dierence between OPEC capacity to deliver oil and the actual
quantity delivered, it is thus a measure of how much oil OPEC is holding back from the
market. This variable has a positive coecient as expected. Finally the proportion of
world oil production which is from OPEC has a signicant positive coecient indicating
that OPEC has considerable market power as is expected from the work of Kaufmann
[2004] and Lin and Tamvakis [2010].
2 The 2012 data is from the US Energy Information Administration and was accessed on 29th
October 2014 from http://www.eia.gov/countries/
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Jan 2002 - Dec 2013 WTI Brent
N = 143 Months Bench Bench + Sentiment Bench Bench + Sentiment
S&P500 0.110 0.215 0.086 0.098
(0.51) (0.14) (0.62) (0.52)
Stoxx 50 -0.249 -0.340** -0.215 -0.186
(0.11) (0.012) (0.18) (0.18)
NKY 0.049 -0.076 0.060 -0.041
(0.65) (0.41) (0.59) (0.67)
Hang Seng 0.247** 0.232** 0.247** 0.225**
(0.030) (0.018) (0.037) (0.028)
USDEUR -0.353*** -0.309*** -0.339*** -0.275***
(1.4 x 10 4) (1.1 x 10 4) (4.2 x 10 4) (9.3 x 10 4)
USDJPY 0.197** 0.213*** 0.152* 0.112
(0.023) (0.004) (0.090) (0.15)
USDHKD 0.074 0.010 0.118 0.042
(0.32) (0.88) (0.13) (0.53)
BDI 0.107 0.078 0.110 0.113*
(0.16) (0.23) (0.16) (0.097)
MoodyCAAA 0.213*** 0.125** 0.173** 0.154**
(0.0034) (0.049) (0.022) (0.018)
US Oil Inventory -0.186** -0.164*** -0.137* -0.084**
(0.011) (0.0096) (0.073) (0.020)
World Oil Supply 0.085 0.066 0.046 -0.014
(0.27) (0.32) (0.57) (0.84)
OPEC Spare Capacity 0.219*** 0.118* 0.203** 0.069
(0.0076) (0.10) (0.017) (0.36)
OPEC Proportion 0.167** 0.143** 0.165** 0.175**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.039) (0.011)
Oil Sentiment 0.443*** 0.459***
(4.5 x 10 10) (4.3 x 10 10)
Log Likelihood 164.43 142.64 170.36 148.50
p-value of the Likelihood
Ratio Test
4.1 x 10 11 3.8 x 10 11
Variance Ratio (F) Test 4.6 x 10 10 2.7 x 10 17 4.9 x 10 8 3.5 x 10 15
Adjusted R2 35.3% 51.9% 29.7% 47.8%
The table shows OLS regression results for the WTI and Brent benchmark models before and after the inclusion of
the sentiment index described by Eqns. (3.1) and (3.2). The data has been rst dierenced and standardized. The
likelihood ratio test formally compares model performance of the sentiment model (Bench + Sentiment) relative to the
benchmark (Bench) model. *, ** and *** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels; p-values appear in brackets
below each coecient. Bold print indicates coecients which were signicant under the Generalised Holm Multiple
Hypothesis Testing framework.
Tab. 5: OLS Regression Results for WTI and Brent 2002 - 2013
4 Results 17
4.2 Review of results and discussion
Recognizing the novel nature of our research into oil market sentiment, we deliberately
take a prudent approach. There is a multiple comparisons problem that exists in this
testing framework; it is a source of bias that we explicitly address by applying recently
developed generalised multiple hypothesis testing (MHT) techniques. The multiple
comparisons problem occurs when a large number of hypothesis tests are performed
simultaneously, leading to a non-negligible likelihood that some statistically signicant
results may be identied by pure random chance alone, rather than as a result of any
underlying statistical relationships. In our testing framework, the model specications
set out a total of 92 individual hypothesis tests comprising of individual coecient
tests, F tests, the unreported ADF tests and likelihood ratio tests. Hence, the multiple
comparisons problem is an important issue to consider and address in order to build
robust conclusions. For a more technical treatment of MHT issues, see Holm [1979],
Romano et al. [2010], Cummins [2013b] and Cummins [2013a].
To give the greatest power to identify true discoveries, we set a probability of  = 0:1
as the upper bound probability that there are k = 5 or more false rejections of null
hypotheses amongst the 92 tests; we choose 5 as this is approximately 5% of the total
number of hypotheses tested. Using these criteria we can be much more assured that the
conclusions we draw are statistically reliable and robust. In this particular study, the
generalised Holm procedure [Romano et al., 2010] leads us to reject 48 null hypotheses
while at the conventional signicance of 5%, 63 hypotheses would have been rejected.
This MHT framework is more conservative than conventional signicance levels, where
in the latter case one ignores the multiple comparisons problem. In so doing wrong
economic conclusions could be drawn from the extra 15 rejected null hypotheses. With
this motivation in place, we revisit the results set out in the previous section (4.1) and
seek to address the multiple comparisons problem that was not explicitly considered.
This is an important statistical correction missing from prior sentiment investigations.
In Table 5 results which are considered signicant under the MHT process are in-
dicated in bold. Most notably, there is no change to the conclusion that the sentiment
indices for WTI and Brent oil signicantly account for oil prices. This is an impor-
tant nding and allows us to argue with statistical condence that sentiment aects
professionally traded oil markets. It is also found that the US$ Euro exchange rate
signicantly explains the movement of oil prices. At the more demanding levels of sig-
nicance required by the MHT procedure, the anomalous result found perviously that
changes in the Stoxx 50 explained WTI price movements is not found to be signicant.
Furthermore the Hang Seng and the BDI are not found to be signicant. The US$
Yen exchange rate, the Moody corporate bond rate, the US oil inventory, OPEC spare
capacity and OPEC proportion are found to be signicant.
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5 Conclusion
We nd that sentiment is an important consideration when explaining WTI and Brent
prices using data from Jan 2002 to Dec 2013. This was done following the methods of
Baker and Wurgler [2006] by building sentiment indices for both WTI and Brent using
similar proxies to those used in equities research. The two indices were constructed
using principal component analysis of the following sentiment proxies: volume of futures
contracts, the volatility of the oil price, oil speculation indicators, the put-call ratio for
options on oil futures and stock index volatility. The inclusion of these sentiment indices
signicantly improved the performance of fundamental models for oil prices as measured
by the likelihood ratio test and also brought about a large increase in the adjusted R2
statistic. The ndings are supported by a multiple hypothesis testing framework which
gives a very high degree of condence that we are not merely observing a chance result
due to the multiple comparison problem.
Sentiment has already been seen to aect equity markets, our ndings expand senti-
ment to energy markets. This not only leaves open the possibility that sentiment indices
can be constructed for energy markets other than oil (gas and coal being the natural
next steps), but also acts as a call for further research on the mechanism by which
sentiment inuences oil pricing, and also a decomposition of this sentiment inuence
into its rational and irrational components. This latter investigation would be of par-
ticular benet to policy makers seeking to control irrational exuberance and excessive
speculation with its associated impact on the economy
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